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ABSTRACT
We introduce a new weekly database of spot and forward US-UK exchange rates as well as interest
rates to examine the integration of forward exchange markets during the classical gold standard
period (1880-1914). Using threshold autoregressions (TAR), we estimate the transactions cost band
of covered interest differentials (CIDs) and compare our results to studies of more recent periods.
Our findings indicate that CIDs for the US-UK rate were generally larger during the classical gold
standard than any period since. We argue that slower information and communications technology
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  The theory of covered interest parity (CIP) holds that the return from buying the 
bonds of one’s domestic country should be the same as that of investing abroad, once 
currency risk has been covered with a forward contract.  Formally, the condition may be 
stated as: 












    
where   represents the domestic currency price of foreign currency in the spot market at 
time t,   is the price of foreign currency deliverable forward at time t,   is the domestic 
interest rate at time t, and   is the corresponding interest rate abroad at time t.  While in 
a world of perfect capital markets (1) would always equal zero, there are frictions and 
transactions costs that will lead to non-zero covered interest differentials (CIDs).   
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Since a perfectly efficient market would lead to zero CIDs, the magnitude of the 
differential has been an important metric of international financial market integration.    
The issue has been the focus of numerous studies across many countries and time periods 
dating back to the 1920s.
1  One period that has not been examined in detail is the classical 
gold standard era (1880-1913).  We introduce a new weekly database of US-UK spot and 
forward exchange rates as well as short-term interest rates to examine the integration of 
forward exchange markets during the classical gold standard period.  Using threshold 
autoregressions (TAR), we find that deviations from covered interest parity were 
generally larger during the classical gold standard period than any period since (except 
for some turbulent periods).  We offer two explanations for our empirical results:  (1) 
  1technological advances since the classical gold standard have dramatically reduced the 
costs of information and arbitrage (Bordo et al., 1999), and (2) Compared to modern 
markets, the classical gold standard lacked well developed financial institutions and 
instruments to engage in covered interest arbitrage. 
We begin the paper with a survey of the previous literature on CIP.  This is 
followed by a discussion of the new database and the methodology employed in the 
empirical analysis.  Then we discuss the empirical results and the implications of our 
findings for future studies of CIP.  
 
II. Previous Literature on CIP 
 
While CIP was not stated as a formal condition in the finance literature until the 
twentieth century, there was evidence of foreign exchange traders engaging in covered 
interest arbitrage in the 1800s (Peel and Taylor, 2002).   Early commentators described 
how deviations from the “parity” condition created profit opportunities for foreign 
exchange speculators.  Clare, for example, provides a late nineteenth and  early twentieth 
century-account of arbitrage activity in forward exchange markets. 
“The relationship that has been referred to as existing between the 
fluctuations of the exchanges and those of money is in the nature of cause and 
effect, and the link which brings them into connection-the agency that transmutes 
a rise or fall in the price of foreign bills into a like move of discount rates-is gold, 
the ebb and flow on which…is itself regulated by demand and supply of means of 
remittance.  As might be expected, it is when specie-point is within measurable 
distance that this connection is most apparent, but at all times some semblance of 
agreement is traceable between the respective price waves, and it may be laid 
down as a general rule that discount tends to harden on a decline of the exchanges 
and to weaken on an advance” (quoted in Peck, 1998, p. 292).   
 
  2Keynes (1923) gave the first formal definition of covered interest parity (CIP), 
verbally describing condition (1).   He, and later Einzig (1937), hypothesized that 
deviations from CIP during the inter-war years would not be arbitraged away unless they 
reached one-half percent per annum. They argued that the funds available for forward 
exchange were inelastically supplied because of lending limits imposed by banks.   
  While there was a literature on covered interest parity in the inter-war period, 
empirical testing of equation (1) did not begin until the late 1960s.  There are two main 
strategies for testing CIP.  One strategy employs regression analysis and utilizes the 
following model (Branson, 1969; Marston, 1976; Cosandier and Liang, 1981): 
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where  is the regression error.  CIP implies that  t ε α =0 and β =1 in equation (2).   
Although some studies have found that α is significantly different from zero, the result 
does not necessarily violate CIP, as a positive constant may simply reflect transaction 
costs.  The parity condition does require β  to equal 1, and most studies have found this 
to be the case.  Taylor (1987), however, points out that even if equation (2) holds, this is 
not strong evidence of covered interest parity.  The regression errors may be quite large, 
and represent unexploited arbitrage opportunities.  Taylor argues that a regression using 
equation (2) may indicate that CIP held on average over a given time period, but not at 
any particular point in time. 
  3  The second methodology measures the size of deviations from CIP.  Departures 
from the parity condition are then compared with known sources of transactions costs to 
determine whether arbitrage opportunities exist.  The methodology also shows how 
deviations change over time to provide some insight into the performance of different 
monetary regimes and central bank policy.   Frenkel and Levich (1975) measure 
deviations from covered interest parity for the US-UK exchange rate for the period 1962-
1967.  They estimate the transactions costs for arbitrage, the ‘neutral band,’ to be 0.145-
0.15 percent per annum.  In a related paper, Frenkel and Levich (1977) estimate the 
transactions cost band for three periods: (1) the tranquil-1962-1967 period, (2) turbulent-
1968-1969 period when England devalued the pound, and (3) the managed float, 1973-
1975.   They estimate the neutral bands to be 0.126-.127, 0.197-.262, and 0.92-1.03 
percent per annum for the three periods, respectively.  
Clinton (1988) argues that previous studies overestimate the transactions costs 
involved in covered interest arbitrage.  Using data from November 1, 1985 to May 9, 
1986, he finds that deviations should be no more than 0.06 percent per annum.  He finds 
that 95 percent of deviations lie between ± .15 percent per annum.  Taylor (1987, 1989) 
criticizes previous work for using time-averaged data as opposed to point-in-time data.  
He employs ‘high quality, high frequency’ and contemporaneously sampled data for spot 
and forward US-UK and UK-GER and Euro-deposit interest rates.  He finds that there are 
very few profitable violations of CIP.  Balke and Wohar (1998) examine daily US-UK 
data from January 1974 until September 1993, and find that the average CID was 0.08 
percent over the period. 
  4Peel and Taylor (2002) examine covered interest differentials during the inter-war 
gold standard using threshold autoregressions (TAR) and a threshold vector error-
correction model (TVECM).  They test the Keynes-Einzig conjecture that covered 
interest differentials could reach one-half percent per annum before arbitrage would take 
place.  Peel and Taylor estimate the neutral band to be .42 percent for the US-UK 
exchange rate in the early 1920s.  Their point estimate is not significantly different from 
the one-half percent figure postulated by Keynes and Einzig. 
  For the Classical gold standard, the literature on forward exchange markets is 
very small.  Davis and Hughes (1960) as well as Perkins (1978) used “time” and sight 
bills from the New York financial markets to impute a “pure” dollar-sterling exchange 
rate for most of the nineteenth century.  These studies did not, however, discuss cross-
border financial market integration using the forward exchange market.  More recently, 
Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) examined international financial market integration over the 
last 130 years using a variety of different tests.
2  One metric included a cursory 
investigation of CIDs for the classical and inter-war gold standards.  Obstfeld and Taylor 
(2002, p. 39) note that their analyses represents “a first pass at the data” given that they 
employ time-averaged spot and 60-day forward exchange rates combined with short-term 
interest rates of a different maturity (3 months).  Their empirical results suggest that CIDs 
were .19 percent for New York and London during the classical gold standard period.  
When compared to post-World War I exchange markets, they conjecture that “the degree 
of integration among core money markets achieved under the classical gold standard 
must be judged as truly impressive compared to conditions over the following half 
century or more” (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2002, p. 39).
3  
  5In this paper, we provide a detailed investigation of CIDs for the US-UK 
exchange rate during the classical gold standard period.  We ask whether the trend 
towards increased financial market integration, as measured by CIDs, began in the 1920s 
or during the classical gold standard period.  The analysis should provide new insight into 
the history of international financial market integration.   
 
III.  Data 
 
  Measuring covered interest differentials has typically meant collecting data on 
forward and spot contracts as well as interest rates for two countries--see equation (2).  
Obstfeld and Taylor (2002, p. 33), however, point out that standard forward exchange 
contracts were not very prevalent before 1920 (p. 33).  They argue instead that CIDs can 
be studied by comparing the onshore and offshore interest rates using the long bill, the 
most liquid financial instrument used to cover exchange risk during the classical gold 
standard period (Margraff, 1908). 
Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) show how to calculate CIDs during the classical gold 
standard period in the New York-London market for sterling (Spalding, 1915). First, 
assume that   is a long bill (the dollar price of sterling at time t in New York deliverable 
in London after 60 days), and   is the spot New York price of sterling in New York.  













, where   is the London 60-day discount rate.  A second method is to purchase a 
long bill on London in New York at a price in terms of current pounds sterling of    
*
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  6The two prices of future pounds should be equal in the absence of transactions costs and 
perfect capital mobility. 
  Perkins (1978) noticed that ( ) 1 b / e t t −  represents an imputed “offshore” British 
interest rate in New York.  The imputed rate can be compared with a short-term interest 
rate in London to measure international financial market integration.  The “covered 
interest differential” can be written as: 
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An important question is the appropriate UK interest rate to plug into equation (3). 
Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) as well as Officer (1996) argue that the 60-day London bank 
bill rate should be used because it is the market determined interest rate.  Figure 1 
presents weekly covered interest differentials for the US-UK exchange rate using the 60-
day bill rate over the period of January 3, 1880 through June 27, 1914.  Weekly spot and 
forward exchange rate data are collected from The Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
and the bank bill rate from The Economist.  All data are sampled contemporaneously to 
provide a point-in-time analysis of CIDs.  Figure 1 shows that CIDs were more volatile 
during the first half of the sample and that there is a positive bias in the time series.  
Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) argue that the bias reflects brokerage commissions from 
exchange contracts, profit margins, and the stamp duty.  The stamp duty introduces an 
upward bias in the differential of approximately .75 percent per year.  The CIDs display a 
tendency to fall over time, in part, because of greater competition among foreign 
exchange dealers that squeezed profits.  
  7  Alternatively, Perkins (1978) argues that the Bank of England's discount rate is 
the appropriate interest rate to impute the offshore “UK” interest rate in New York.  He 
notes that the Brown Brothers, the largest foreign exchange dealer in the United States 
for most of the nineteenth century, charged customers five percent interest or the Bank of 
England discount rate, whichever was higher, for import letters of credit.  Figure 2 shows 
CIDs calculated with the Bank of England discount rate.  The CIDs appear nearly 
symmetric around zero and less volatile than the differentials computed using the market 
driven bank bill rate.  CIDs are above the parity line at the beginning of the sample period 
and then fall below it in the early 1890s, only to rise above the origin in the early 1900s.  
The up and down pattern persists until the outbreak of World War I.   
Many early references on foreign exchange also point to the Bank of England's 
discount rate as the relevant interest rate for covering exchange risk.  Brown (1914) and 
Deutsch (1914) describe the effects of changes in the Bank of England's discount rate on 
foreign exchange rates.  Shaterian (1956) notes that a New York banker buying a sterling 
bill must take into account the Bank of England’s discount rate.  For our analysis, the 
appropriate interest rate to employ in the study is an empirical question that can be 
resolved using newly developed techniques in time series econometrics.  We now turn to 
the empirical analysis.  
 
IV.  Empirical Methodology 
 
  A TAR model will be estimated for the CIDs using the new weekly data set.    
Following Obstfeld and Taylor (1997, 2002), we model the CID given in (3).  We denote 
  8this quantity as  t φ  and assume that the differential behaves according to the following 
time series process:  
 
(4)   κ φ ε αφ φ < + = − − 1 1 t t t t if  
 
(5)   () κ φ ε ρφ ρ κ φ ≥ + + − = − − 1 1 1 t t t t if   
 
(6)   () κ φ ε ρφ ρ κ φ − ≤ + + − − = − − 1 1 1 t t t t if        
      
This model is known as a band-TAR model and has been employed in Balke and Fomby 
(1997) and Peel and Taylor (2002).  When  1 − t φ lies within the band dictated by κ ,  t φ  
follows an autoregressive process with mean zero. However, if  1 − t φ  lies outside of the 
band,  t φ  follows a different autoregressive process with a different mean.  Simple 
calculations show that the process reverts to the edge of the bands when the process is in 
an outer regime.   
  In this paper, we interpret κ as representing some critical level which includes 
transactions costs.  Beyond κ , arbitrage becomes profitable, and the process reverts to 
the edge of the band.  In the TAR literature, it is sometimes, although not always the case 
that  α  is constrained to be one.  Such a specification imposes the restriction that the 
differential follows a unit root process when inside the band.  We will present estimates 
of both the constrained and unconstrained models.   
  9  An interesting question to ask is whether a band-TAR model is a worthwhile 
generalization for modeling the differential, t φ .  If we take our null hypothesis as  t φ  
follows a simple autoregressive process, the parameter κ becomes unnecessary, and is 
not identified.  Standard statistical theory no longer applies in this case.  In light of this 
problem, Hansen (1996) proposes Lagrange Multiplier tests for null hypotheses of this 
form and develops a simulation procedure to find p-values for each test.  We employ two 
variants of these tests in this paper in order to support the use of a band-TAR model.   
  Given that a band-TAR model is estimated, it is natural to find confidence 
intervals for the parameters.  In particular, the parameterκ  has an interesting economic 
interpretation, and a confidence interval is a welcome addition to any point estimate we 
calculate.  Again, standard statistical theory no longer applies to estimates of κ .  Hansen 
(2000) provides a procedure to calculate confidence intervals for threshold parameters 
such as κ .  To apply this procedure, we search for a threshold parameter κ over a range 
that contains 90% of the data.  In some cases, we fail to find a 95% confidence interval 
within this initial range.  Typically, although not always, this occurs in cases where the 
LM tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no threshold effects.  Such an occurrence 
seems natural since the absence of a threshold would imply infinitely wide confidence 
intervals for a threshold parameter.  Hence, we provide confidence intervals only in those 




  10V.  Results and Discussion 
 
Table 1 shows the TAR results for the US-UK rate during the Classical Gold 
Standard period using the Bank of England discount rate.  We also estimated the TAR 
model using the 60-day London bank bill rate but were unable to reject the null 
hypothesis of no TAR at the 5 and 10 percent levels of significance for the whole sample 
period as well as all sub-sample periods.    For the classical gold standard period (1880-
1914), we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no TAR at the 5 and 10 percent 
levels of significance using Hansen's Sup or Average LM test.  We also do not find 
evidence of TAR at the five or 10 percent levels of significance for the 1880-1896 sub-
period.  There is, however, strong evidence of TAR in the 1897-1914 sub-period.  The 
Sup-LM and the Average LM test statistics are significant at the 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.
4  Overall, the results point to the development of a credible modern forward 
exchange market during the late 1890s.  
Table 2 also presents the unconstrained along with the constrained results where 
we force the CIDs to follow a driftless random walk inside the neutral band.  This is a 
common restriction to test in studies of forward exchange markets because it assumes 
that CIDs move unpredictably within a region close to a zero differential.  This simply 
means that arbitrage does not take place in some area around a CID of zero.  Using a 
simple t-test, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis (H0: α=1) that the CIDs follow a 
driftless random walk inside the band for all three periods at the five or 10 percent level 
of significance.     
  11For purposes of comparison, Table 2 presents our results along with the average 
CID found in exchange rate studies of different periods.  Table 2 shows that CIDs have 
generally fallen over time.   Peel and Taylor (2002) estimate the neutral band to be .422 
percent per annum during the inter-war gold standard.  Frankel and Levich (1975) find 
that CIDs fell to about .14 percent per annum during the 1960s and increased to about 1 
percent per year during the turbulent 1970s.  Since the mid-1970s, CIDs have declined 
substantially.  Clinton (1988), Balke and Wohar (1998), for example, have found that the 
average differential is less than .1 percent per annum for various periods covering the last 
20 years.  
Tables 1 and 2 also show that CIDs were larger for the classical gold standard era 
than other periods, except for the turbulent 1970s.
5  For the period 1880-1914, we 
estimate the neutral band to be .80 percent per annum, although it is not statistically 
significant.  We also estimate the neutral band to be .94 percent per annum and 
insignificant for the 1880-1896 sub-period with a 95 percent confidence interval of .832 
to .953 per annum.  We find the neutral band to be approximately .748 (.6005 
constrained) percent per annum for the sub-period 1897-1914 with a 95 percent 
confidence interval of 0.60 to ∞ per annum.  Except for the 1970s, the point estimates 
and lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence intervals for the gold standard are larger 
than those found by studies of other periods. 
Another interesting empirical finding from the classical gold standard period is 
the slow speed of mean reversion outside the band.  Table 1 shows that the autoregressive 
parameter outside the band for the largest root,ρ ~, was approximately .9 (1 – 0.111) 
during the period 1897-1914.  The point estimate is even larger than Peel and Taylor’s 
  12(2002) .8 estimate of the autoregressive parameter during the inter-war gold standard, 
although the two figures are not statistically different from one another.  The evidence 
suggests that arbitrage in forward exchange markets was quite slow during both the 
classical and inter-war gold standards.           
We offer two explanations for our findings that CIDs were larger during the 
classical gold standard and have tended to fall over time, in addition to the slow speed of 
arbitrage.  First, a recent study by Bordo et al. (1999) shows that economic and financial 
integration in the late 1800s was less than that of modern times.   They note that there 
were significantly fewer short-term financial flows between countries a century ago 
relative to long-term investment than today.   The authors argue that a major reason for 
less integration in the late 1800s is technology.  “It should be apparent why this 
information and communications technology translated into a smaller volume of short-
term capital flows.  Today currency traders respond almost instantaneously to minute-to-
minute changes in currency values” (Bordo et al., 1999, p. 32).  The implication for our 
study is that higher information costs reduce the ability of traders to engage in arbitrage, 
leading to larger CIDs. 
A second factor that may explain the larger CIDs and slow mean reversion during 
the classical gold standard is that there were few financial institutions (compared to 
today) capable of handling a large volume of transactions in forward exchange.  This was 
even true of core money centers like London and New York.  Einzig (1937, p. 60) points 
outs that “only towards the end of the nineteenth century and during the early years of 
this century that a Foreign Exchange market of any size developed in London.”  He 
argues that the reason for the small number of forward exchange facilities is found in the 
  13very stability of the dollar-sterling spot rate during most of the nineteenth century.  The 
credibility of the dollar-sterling spot rate reduced the demand for forward exchange as 
importers and exporters did not need to hedge their risks to lock-in profits from foreign 
trade.
6  Importers and exporters were probably less concerned about losing money from 
exchange rate fluctuations than businesses today. 
A related factor is that unlike modern exchange markets (that have a variety of 
derivatives and options to hedge risks in exchange markets), the classical gold standard 
was just beginning to use innovative financial instruments that did not require the 
international trade of goods to carry out covered interest arbitrage.  Professor Edwin 
Kemmerer, in his testimony to the National Monetary Commission in 1910, stated that 
finance bills, short-term debt instruments often used to speculate in forward exchange 
markets, did not appear in large quantities until the turn of the century -1900 (Goodhart, 
1969).   
“Since the beginning of the present century there has been a very great 
development in the use of finance bills in New York City as a means of 
borrowing upon European account…Finance bills are drawn in considerable 
quantities during the two or three months preceding the crop moving demand 
when exchange is usually high with the expectation on the part of American 
bankers of covering by means of cereal and cotton bills in the fall at lower rates of 
exchange” (quoted in Goodhart, 1969, p. 56). 
 
Another empirical finding is the absence of TAR during the 1880-1896 period.   
Figures 1-3 also show that CIDs were more volatile during this period.  We believe that 
this result can be explained by silver risk that plagued the United States after the Civil 
War.  The United States left the gold standard during the Civil War to print fiat money 
for war finance.  After the war, the government retired the fiat currency so the United 
State could return to the gold standard.  The decrease in the money supply caused 
  14deflation that increased the real debt burden for borrowers.  Debtors wanted silver to 
become part of the money supply to increase inflation and reduce the real value of their 
mortgages and loans.  The hopes of debtors rested on William Jennings Bryan who ran as 
the Democratic nominee for President of the United States on a silver platform in 1896.  
Hallwood et al. (2000) show that the US suffered from a peso problem in the 1890s 
because many currency speculators believed the US might abandon the gold standard and 
adopt a bimetallic system.  Silver risk generated uncertainty in financial markets, 
preventing speculators from pushing the covered interest differential back within a 
narrow range.   
Once fears of silver adoption subsided with Bryan's defeat in the Presidential 
election of 1896, however, market participants were more confident in the maintenance 
of mint parity.  This may explain why we find significant threshold effects in the period 
1897-1914.  The resolution of the silver issue combined with the Gold Standard Act of 
1900 (which established gold as the only monetary standard for the US) enhanced the 
United States' credibility in foreign exchange markets.   Currency traders were now 
willing to take positions on both sides of forward exchange contracts and large deviations 




How does the classical gold standard compare to other period in terms of forward 
market integration?  This paper offers some insight into this question.  We employ a new 
weekly database of spot and forward exchange rates and interest rates to estimate CIDs 
  15during the classical gold standard period.  Applying new techniques in time series 
econometrics, we estimate the size of the neutral band for the US-UK exchange rate from 
1880-1914.  We then compare our findings to studies that have examined CIDs for other 
periods since the classical gold standard.  Our results indicate that CIDs have had a 
tendency to fall over time with the gold standard period having the largest differentials.  
We offer two explanations for the findings.  First, information traveled much slower 
during the gold standard period.  Higher information costs led to fewer short-term 
financial flows, leading to larger CIDs.  Forward exchange markets during the gold 
standard were less liquid and did not have the depth of modern ones.  Second, compared 
to modern exchange markets, the gold standard did not have well-developed financial 
institutions and instruments to support a “large volume” (in the modern sense) of trading 
in forward markets. 










  16                                                                                                                                                 
1 For a literature survey on covered interest arbitrage see Officer and Willett (1979), 
Taylor (1992, 1995), McCallum (1996), and Willett et al. (2003).  
2  Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) examine gross stocks of foreign capital, real interest rates, 
and equity and bond returns for a broad range of countries to assess global financial 
market integration since 1870.  They conclude that financial market integration during 
the gold standard period rivals that of the current period. 
3 Most research on the classical gold standard has focused on the spot exchange rate.  In a 
series of influential papers, Officer (1989, 1996) provides detailed historical and 
empirical evidence that the US-UK spot market was “remarkably efficient” with very few 
profit opportunities.  Prakash and Taylor (1998) confirm Officer's (1986) analysis using 
TAR models. 
4 We selected the lag length on the autoregression for the TAR models on the basis of the 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC).  The AIC chose a lag length of 12 for the 1880-1914 
period as well as the 1880-1896 sub-period.  The model selection criteria chose a lag 
length of four for the 1897-1914 period. 
5  Other turbulent periods such as World War I and the Korean War may also have had 
higher CIDs than the Classical Gold Standard.  Unfortunately, a study of CIDs during the 
two wars is not very informative because of government administered price controls. 
6  Einzig’s comments on the credibility of the dollar-sterling rate refer to the entire 
nineteenth century.   For a discussion of the credibility of the classical gold standard, see 
Bordo and Kydland (1996), and Bordo and Rockoff (1996). 
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  20Table 1 
TAR Results, Bank of England Discount Rate 
Time Period  1880-1914  1880-1896  1897-1914 
Sup LM p-value  0.286 0.410  0.0180** 
Avg. LM p-value  0.252 0.494  0.010*** 
κ ~  (constrained)  0.803 0.940 0.6005 
^
κ (unconstrained) 
0.803 0.940  0.747 
95% CI  (0.780, ∞)
a  (0.832,0.953) (0.600,∞)
a 














Observations  1800 887  912 
 
**denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
***denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
a If no upper bound for the confidence interval is found in the lower 90 percent of the 
data, we denote the upper bounds as infinite.  Note, however, that this does not affect the 
lower bound, and there is no reason to expect any symmetry in the confidence intervals 







  21Table 2 
Empirical Results of Covered Interest Arbitrage 
Study  Time Period  Estimated Size of Neutral Band (% Per Annum)  
(95% Confidence Intervals) 
Classical Gold Standard  1880-1914  0.803 
(.780, ∞)
 
Classical Gold Standard (sub-sample)  1880-1896  0.940 
(0.832, 0.953)  
Classical Gold Standard (sub-sample)  1897-1914  0.748 
(0.600, ∞)
 
Peel and Taylor (2002)  1922-1925  0.422 
(0.409, 0.518) 
Frenkel and Levich (1975)  1962-1967  0.126-0.127
b 
 
Frenkel and Levich (1977)  1968-1969  0.197-0.262
b 
 
Frenkel and Levich (1977)  1973-1975  0.92-1.03
b 
 
Clinton (1988)  Nov. 1985 - May 1986  0.15
c 
 




b Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977) calculate quasi-confidence intervals by determining 
the percentage deviation that bounds 95 percent of the CIDs.   
 
c Clinton (1988) derives his estimates of the neutral band using bid-ask spreads.  He finds 
that 95 percent of the CIDs for the US-UK rate lie between ± .15 percent per annum. 
 
d Balke and Wohar (1998)  find that approximately 90 percent of the CIDs for the US-UK 








  22Figure 1





































































































































































































US-UK Covered Interest Differentials (with Bank of England discount rate), 1880-1914
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